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When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as 
productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population into two 
groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those 
who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group a first-
best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types 
worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals will necessarily face a 
bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller 
as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative. 
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One striking feature of the recent evolution of tax policy around the world has been the
mounting unpopularity of wealth transfer taxation. An increasing number of countries
are without inheritance (or estate) taxes and some, including the US, are contemplat-
ing ways to phase them out. At the same time, countries that continue to tax wealth
transfers raise little revenue from them, despite the fact that the transmitted wealth is
increasing.1 In academic circles, there is little agreement on how these taxes should be
structured. Many believe this issue is part of the broader question of taxation of wealth
and wealth income, and must be analyzed in that context. We agree with Kopczuk
(2009) that the question is best addressed in the most general framework of designing
the economy’s overall tax policy.
The controversies surrounding estate taxes reﬂect, to a great extent, disagreement
over bequest motives. The literature has highlighted a number of reasons for bequests:
pure altruism, warm glow, strategic (deferred payment for ﬁlial attention), and acci-
dental.2 Yet there is little agreement regarding the relative strength of each of theses
elements. Studies suggest that the size of the estate tax is highly sensitive to the rela-
tive importance of diﬀerent bequest motives.3 Not surprisingly, then, one’s view on the
question of motive shapes also one’s view on the appropriate tax treatment of bequests.
While little agreement exists concerning taxation of bequests in general, there is a
widely-held view that accidental bequests should be subjected to a conﬁscatory tax.
Kaplow (2008, pp 264—66) gives a lucid exposition of the reasons behind this view.
Seen from the perspective of oﬀsprings, Kaplow argues, full insurance in the face of
an uncertain inheritance income is optimal. A 100% bequest tax, with its proceeds
rebated equally to all children, leads to no distortions and mimics this insurance scheme.
1The proceeds do not typically exceed one percent of the aggregate tax revenues; see OECD (2008).
2When annuity markets are imperfect, most people will have a positive wealth at death, even when
they have no bequest motive per se; see Cremer and Pestieau (2005).
3See, e.g., Michel and Pestieau (2002) and Pestieau and Sato (2008).
1Alternatively, seen from the parents’ perspective, the optimal scheme is one of perfect
annuities. Kopczuk (2003) points out that this market too, under certain conditions,
can be mimicked by a government policy which includes 100% bequest taxes. To eﬀect
the ﬁrst-best solution, one must give the retirees a wealth supplement and then fully
tax the wealth of those who die early. However, the availability of wealth supplements
rests on the individuals’ having strong bequest motives.
Blumkin and Sadka (2003) is, to our knowledge, the only paper that questions the
wisdom of the received view in the context of a second-best tax policy design. They
argue that a non-conﬁscatory tax on accidental bequests has the desirable consequence of
making the demogrant of an optimal linear income tax system eﬀectively non-uniform.
In this sense, it will act as an additional instrument and increases the eﬃciency of
the tax system. Our challenge to the 100% tax idea is more basic and relies on the
understanding that bequests have informational content that should be incorporated in
the design of optimal tax structures.
The paper considers a setting where accidental bequests signal otherwise unobserv-
able individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity. In this setup, ignor-
ing the informational content of bequests calls for a 100% tax rate on bequests (within
the context of the tax system as a whole and when tax instruments are not artiﬁcially
restricted).4 We show this result is unwarranted when the informational content of
accidental bequests is taken into account.
The basic idea is for the tax administration to use the information on individuals’
inheritances as a separation mechanism, or a “tag,” when designing an optimal tax
system. In this way, it can partition the population into two groups: one consisting of
4The tax neither distorts the behavior of parents nor their utility as they have no bequest motive. The
behavior of recipients is not distorted either as accidental bequests are a windfall for them. Moreover, as
long as the inheritance tax they pay is determined as part of their total tax liabilities, the recipients will
not become any worse oﬀ. This follows because the existence of a non-distortionary source of revenue
reduces the amount of the distortionary tax that the government needs to raise. The optimal allocations
of diﬀerent households must be independent of who initially owns the non-distortionary revenue sources.
2people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The ﬁrst group
faces a tax schedule determined on the basis of Mirrlees’ standard optimal non-linear
income tax problem. The second group, on the other hand, faces a non-distortionary
tax scheme. Two interesting and inter-related results emerge. One is that inheritances
make the high-ability types worse oﬀ and the low-ability types better oﬀ. Second, the
high-ability types should face a bequest tax that necessarily exceeds 100% but that the
low-ability types face a tax rate that can be smaller or larger than 100% and may even
be negative.
The fundamental message underlying these results is that publicly observable be-
quests have informational content that should be incorporated in the design of optimal
tax structures. This is a general point that applies to all types of bequests regardless of
bequest motives. However, the paper considers accidental bequests only and uses a styl-
ized model as the vehicle for demonstrating its results. It does so in order to make this
p o i n ts t a r ka n di nas i m p l i ﬁed way. That we concentrate on accidental bequests does
not mean that other bequest motives do not matter. Nor do we claim that accidental
bequests are the most important type of bequests. Their choice is motivated by the fact
that they are the only type of bequests for which there is a consensus as to how they
should be taxed. Similarly, our approach is motivated by the fact that circumventing
the identiﬁcation of bequest motives, simpliﬁes the analysis drastically and highlights
our point most succinctly.
Finally, in emphasizing the informational content of bequests, the paper balances
the availability of information with practical considerations. Thus we do not allow the
tax liability of an individual to be based directly on his parents’ income. From a purely
theoretical (mechanism) design perspective, this restriction is arbitrary. However, the
assumption is a sensible one from a practical perspective. Tax schedules are often
restricted to depend on contemporaneous variables only. A person’s income tax liability
in a given period, for example, does not even depend on his full earning history. It is
3these practical considerations that motivate our conditioning an individual’s tax liability
on his own transactions, income levels, or wealth, alone. Incorporating the available
information on the previous generation does not signiﬁcantly change our formal analysis.
However, the interpretation of the results would change as the information that can
be obtained from bequests could also be obtained from these other variables. Put
diﬀerently, we would have a redundancy in the informational structure.
2T h e s e t t i n g
2.1 Basic model
Consider a two-period overlapping-generation model wherein individuals of each gener-
ation live either for one or two periods. Regardless of their longevity, they work in the
ﬁrst period only. Those whose parents die early (i.e., live for one period) receive an
inheritance from their parents; those whose parents live for two periods receive nothing.
There are no annuity markets. All individuals, at the beginning of period one, allocate
their resources–earnings plus any inheritances–between present consumption and sav-
ing to be consumed when retired. If individuals stay alive in the second period, they will
consume all their savings and leave no bequests; if they die early, their unused saving is
transmitted to their children as an accidental bequest. Saving is channeled into future
consumption through a storage technology; there is no appreciation or depreciation of
savings so that the interest rate is zero.
Individuals diﬀer in their productivity wi, their survival probability πi, and taste for
future versus present consumption. To model the taste diﬀerence, we assign a weight
βi to future consumption in the individuals’ utility functions. We assume that each of
these characteristics take only two values: “high” indexed by h a n d“ l o w ”i n d e x e db y
 . We further assume that these characteristics are positively correlated so that there
are only two types of people: h and   with wh >w  ,πh >π  , and βh >β  .5 Types are
5It is suﬃcient to assume πh ≥ π  and βh ≥ β  with one of the two inequalities being strict.
4dynastically immutable: if a person is of type i, his oﬀsprings will also be of type i.6
There is no population growth and each generation consists of ni individuals of type i,
where nh + n  =1 .
Individuals have additive quasi-linear preferences over present consumption, ci,f u -
ture consumption, di, and labor supply, Li.7 An individual’s expected utility is given
by
Ui = πi [ci + βiφ(di) − ϕ(Li)] + (1 − πi)[ci − ϕ(Li)]
= ci + πiβiφ(di) − ϕ(Li),i = h, , (1)
where φ is strictly concave while ϕ is strictly convex.8
Individuals of the ﬁrst generation start life with no initial wealth. This will not be
the case for members of the generations that follow, however. Those who die early leave
an accidental bequest which, unless taxed away, is inherited by their children. Conse-
quently, besides wi,πi and βi, individuals of the second and forthcoming generations
will diﬀer also on the basis of their inherited wealth, ωi. The quasi-linearity of the
utility function (1) ensures that the size of one’s (accidental) bequest to his children is
unaﬀected by the size of the inheritance that he may have received from his own parents
(including zero). We will then have, in each period, four groups of people: h-types with
either ωh or no inherited wealth and  -types with either ω  or no inherited wealth.9
Preston (1975), and Pritchett and Summers (1996), provide empirical support for the existence of
a positive correlation between ability and longevity; and Bommier (2006) for a positive correlation
between longevity and preferences for future over present consumption.
6That bequests have informational content whose use improves the design of bequest taxes remains
valid even if this assumption is dropped. However, the underlying tagging problem would become
signiﬁcantly more complicated. See the Conclusion for further discussion of this issue.
7This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis and exposition of our results. It is not crucial for the main
results of this paper concerning the properties of ﬁrst- and second-best allocations (and the associated
tax policies). These result, derived below, carry over with only minor modiﬁcations to a setting with
general preferences . See the last paragraph in the Conclusion.
8This formulation assumes that an individual derives no utility from leaving an accidental bequest
for his family if he dies early.
9Dependence of the bequest one leaves on the inheritance one receives leads to multiplicity of groups
on the basis of ωi, making existence of a steady state problematic. Observe also that even with quasi-
52.2 Laissez-faire
Recall that there is no annuity market and that private saving, si, i st h eo n l ys o u r c ef o r
ﬁnancing one’s consumption during retirement years. The optimization problem of an
i-type individual (i = h, ) in the ﬁrst generation is
max
si,Li
Ui = wiLi − si + πiβiφ(si) − ϕ(Li), (2)
where we have substituted wiLi−si for ci, and si for di, in the individual’s expected util-
ity given by equation (1). The optimization yields πiβiφ0 (si)=1 ,o rsi = φ0−1 (1/πiβi),
and wi = ϕ0 (Li). These relationships, along with the assumptions πh >π  , βh >β  ,
strict concavity of φ, and strict convexity of ϕ,i m p l yt h a tsh >s   and Lh >L  .F i -
nally, observe that since in the absence of annuity markets every i-type person saves si
to ﬁnance his future consumption, those who die early must leave an accidental bequest
of si behind. That is, ωi = si.
The optimization problem of individuals belonging to second and forthcoming gen-
erations depends on whether they inherit an initial wealth or not. Those who receive no
inheritance have an identical optimization problem to that of the ﬁrst generation. This
continues to be summarized by (2), resulting in the same solution as those obtained for
the ﬁrst generation. In particular, a second-generation i-type with no inheritance will
s a v et h es a m ea m o u n ta saﬁrst-generation i-type. It then also follows that any bequest
left by a second-generation i-type with no inheritance will be identical to that of the
ﬁrst-generation i-type: ωi = si.









linear preferences ωi may take more than two values if the prices (tax rates) that individuals face depend
on their inheritance status. We discuss this issue below when addressing second-best allocations and
their implementation.
6where the symbol ˆ over a variable indicates that it refers to a person who has received
an inheritance, and we have substituted wib Li + ωi − b si for b ci and b si for b di.T h eq u a s i -
linearity of preferences implies that future consumption and labor supply do not depend
on inherited wealth so that b si = si and b Li = Li. However, present consumption increases
with wealth and b ci >c i. Clearly, with b si = si, b ωi = ωi and equal to the bequest of an
i-type of the ﬁrst generation. Finally, with sh >s   and Lh >L  ,i tt h u sa l s of o l l o w s
that b sh > b s  and b Lh > b L .
The quasi-linearity assumption ensures that, starting with generation two, the econ-
omy is in a stationary-state equilibrium. After that, the equilibrium values of all the
variables remain invariant to time. Speciﬁcally, in every period, there will always be n 
unskilled and nh skilled individuals. Of the unskilled workers, n (1−π ) have an initial
wealth equal to ω  = s  and the remaining n π  have no wealth; of the skilled workers,
nh(1−πh) have an initial wealth ωh = sh and nhπh have no wealth. And, with sh >s  ,
it is also the case that ωh >ω  .
3F i r s t - b e s t
3.1 Allocation
Assume there is full information. In particular, individual types i = h, ,a sw e l la s
the size of their inherited wealth (whether zero or ωi), are publicly observable. The
ﬁrst-best policy is attained when the government chooses (ci,d i,L i) and
³
b ci, b di, b Li
´
to






πiv(Ui)+( 1− πi)v(b Ui)
i
, (4)
where v is a strictly concave transformation of the quasi-linear utility function (1); hence
v0 > 0 and v00 < 0. Aside from this transformation, the social welfare function deﬁned
by (4) is utilitarian in form in that it aggregates the utilities of the four groups–h-a n d
 -types, each with and without an inheritance–and assigns each a weight according to
7their numbers in the society. The role of v is to make the social welfare function redis-
tributive. Without such a transformation, there will be no aversion to inequality and
thus no redistribution. Observe also that the more concave v is the more redistributive
the social welfare function will be. One common speciﬁcation for v is the iso-elastic
case v(U)=U1−ε/(1 − ε), suggested by Atkinson (1973) and used in the numerical
examples below. In this formulation, ε>0 (ε 6=1 ) denotes the inequality aversion
index and the higher is ε the greater will be the desired redistribution.





πi (wiLi − ci − πidi)+( 1− πi)
³
wib Li − b ci − πib di
´i
≥ 0. (5)
The speciﬁcation of this constraint implies that the resources available to any genera-
tion are spent in full, with the inheritances that any generation receives oﬀsetting the
bequests it leaves.10 First-best optimum is then characterized by choosing (ci,d i,L i)
and
³
b ci, b di, b Li
´
to maximize (4) subject to (5).11 Let μ denote the Lagrangian multiplier






















wib Li − b ci − πib di
´i)
. (6)
















10While inheritances one generation receives may in principle be diﬀerent from the bequests it leaves,
such an outcome cannot happen in the steady state.
11T h e r ei sa l s ot h ec o n s t r a i n tt h a tsi = wiLi − ci ≥ 0, which we assume to be non-binding.
8Denoting the ﬁrst-best values by superscript FB, it follows from (8)—(9) that
b Ui = Ui ≡ UFB, (10)
b dh = dh ≡ dFB
h > b d  = d  ≡ dFB
  , (11)
b Lh = Lh ≡ LFB
h > b L  = L  ≡ LFB
  , (12)
where the ﬁrst inequality sign follows from βh >β   and the strict concavity of φ, and
the second from wh >w   and the strict convexity of ϕ. Observe also that equations
(10)—(12) imply
b ci = ci ≡ cFB
i ,
so that, at the ﬁrst-best, the diﬀerence in type aﬀects one’s allocation but not the
diﬀerence in inheritance status. Put diﬀerently, allocations of h-a n d -types diﬀer but
either one gets the same allocation regardless of receiving an inheritance or not.
3.2 Tax policy
We now show that the government is able to decentralize the ﬁrst-best allocations
through a combination of saving subsidies and lump-sum taxes. Saving subsidies need
only be conditioned on types, but not on inherited wealth, and set at a rate equal to
τi =1− πi, (13)
for type i = h, . Lump sum taxes, which can be negative as well as positive, on the
other hand, must be conditioned on types as well as inherited wealth:
¡
b th,b t 
¢
for those
with an inheritance and (th,t  ) for those without. Naturally, these ﬁscal instruments





πi (ti − τisi)+( 1− πi)
¡
b ti − τib si
¢¤
=0 .
9To see how the optimum is decentralized, observe that the presence of τi,b ti, and ti
changes the budget constraints of the i-type with and without an inheritance to
ci +( 1− τi)si = wiLi + ωi − b ti,
ci +( 1− τi)si = wiLi − ti.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the i-type’s optimization problem, with or without an
inheritance, yield ϕ0 (Li)=wi and
πiβiφ0 (si)=1− τi = πi.
These are identical to their ﬁrst-best counterparts resulting in b Li = Li = LFB
i and
b si = si = sFB
i . Additionally, to ensure b ci = ci = cFB
i , one must set lump-sum taxes at
the rates ti = wiLFB
i − cFB
i − πisFB
i and b ti = wiLFB
i + ωi − cFB
i − πisFB
i .
Finally, observe that the expressions for b ti and ti show that
b ti = ti + ωi.
Now, given identical tax rates on savings, it is natural to consider the diﬀerence be-
tween b ti and ti as the tax on bequests. Alternatively, one can consider the bequest tax
to be the diﬀerence between one’s total tax liabilities when he receives an inheritance
and when he does not. There is no tension between these deﬁnitions, however. Given
identical savings under the two scenarios (b si = si),b o t hd e ﬁnitions lead to the same
answer:12 The implementation of ﬁrst-best allocations requires a 100% taxation of (acci-
12Denote the net taxes an i-type pays, i = h, , by Ti if he does not receives an inheritance and by e Ti
if he does. It must then be the case that
Ti = ti − τisi,
e Ti = e ti − τie si.
With ti = e ti − ωi and si = e si, it also follows that
Ti = e Ti − ωi.
10dental) bequests. The i-type with an inheritance ωi, i = h, , sees his entire inheritance
“conﬁscated,” after which he is treated like his counterpart with no inheritance.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a society with two types of individuals i = h, , whose pref-
erences are deﬁned by (1). The types are identiﬁed by their productivity wi, their sur-
vival probability πi, and the utility weight they assign to their consumption in retire-
ment βi. T h et y p ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa r ed y n a s t i c a lly immutable and satisfy the property
(wh,πh,βh) > (w ,π ,β ).
(i) First-best allocations are characterized by (a) equalization of utilities of all indi-
viduals regardless of their type and inheritance status: b Uh = Uh = b U  = U ,a n d( b )a
higher accidental bequest for individuals of type h: ωh >ω  .
(ii) Decentralization of ﬁrst-best allocations requires: (a) Saving subsidies condi-
tioned on types, but not on inherited wealth, set at a rate equal to τi =1− πi for type
i, and (b) lump sum taxes conditioned on types as well as inherited wealth:
¡
b th,b t 
¢
for
those with an inheritance and (th,t  ) for those without.
(iii) All accidental bequests are taxed at 100%.
4S e c o n d - b e s t
4.1 Allocation
Deﬁne the second-best as a setting wherein individual types, i.e., the characteristics
(wi,πi,βi), and labor supplies, Li, are not publicly observable. The observables are
gross earnings (b Ii = wib Li,I i = wiLi), consumption during working years and retirement
(b ci, b di;ci,d i), and bequests ωi. This follows the traditional information structure in
optimal non-linear income tax models à la Mirrlees. The only diﬀerence is that we have
added bequests as an observable variable and thus potentially taxable.13 The key point
13Recall that throughout the paper we assume that an individual’s tax liability depends only on
variables pertaining to the individual himself: income, consumption, and inheritances received. Socio-
11that we make is that observability of bequests is suﬃcient to identify its recipient’s
type. On the other hand, the type of an individual who receives no inheritance remains
unknown to the government. Given this information structure, the tax administration
uses an individual’s inheritance as a separation mechanism, or a “tag,” when designing
an optimal tax system.14
We start by assuming that the government is able to identify the type of a person
who receives a bequest and then show that this is in fact the case. Given this assump-
tion, the government proceeds to partition the population into two groups: Those who
receive an inheritance and those who do not (tagged as “positive inheritance” and “zero
inheritance”). The zero-inheritance group, consisting of people whose ability remains
private information, will have to face a tax schedule determined on the basis of Mirrlees’
standard optimal non-linear income tax problem. The positive-inheritance group, on
the other hand, need not face a second-best tax schedule. This group consists of peo-
ple whose characteristics can be inferred from the level of the inheritance they receive.
Hence a full information solution can be achieved within this group.
To describe the optimal tax policy, we ﬁrst characterize the optimal allocation con-
strained by the information structure just sketched. As is commonly done in the lit-
erature on tagging, one can formulate the problem within each group independently;
connecting the two via the economy’s resource constraint.15 Put diﬀerently, one as-
signs a single resource constraint to the two groups. This continues to be represented
by (5). Let μ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the economy’s resource
constraint, and λ the multiplier associated with the incentive constraint in the group of
individuals who receive no inheritance. The Lagrangian expression associated with this
political considerations prevent the government to condition a person’s tax liability on his parents’
characteristics.
14Akerlof (1978) is the classic paper on tagging. Boadway and Pestieau (2006), and Cremer et al.
(2010), are among the more recent contributions to this literature.
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In writing (14), we have followed the common practice of writing the problem in
terms of the (observable) pre-tax income for individuals in the zero-inheritance group
(writing labor supply as Ii/wi). People in the positive-inheritance group face no in-
centive constraint; their earning abilities are observable. Here, to stress the ﬁrst-best
nature of the problem within this group, we specify the decision variable to be b Li–an
observable as in Section 3.16
Observe that bequests do not appear directly in the economy’s resource constraint.
This follows because bequests are simply a transfer between generations, with the inher-
itances one generation receives oﬀsetting the bequests it leaves. However, bequests ap-
pear indirectly in (14), being the deﬁning characteristic of zero- and positive-inheritance
groups. It is because of the information that bequests convey that (14) does not contain
an incentive constraint for people in the positive-inheritance group.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for i = h,  are, for people with an inheritance:
∂L
∂b ci







































16Although one can equally express the problem in terms of e Ii.
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v0 (U ) − μ
¤
− λ =0 , (21)
∂L
∂d 
= n π 
£
v0 (U )π β φ0 (d ) − μπ 
¤
− λπhβhφ0 (d )=0 , (22)
∂L
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Consider ﬁrst the group who receive an inheritance. Simplifying and rearranging equa-
















This is the same characterization as in the ﬁrst best indicating no distortion on either
labor supply or future consumption. This is not surprising. We have a ﬁrst-best solution
for the people in positive-inheritance group because their characteristics are observable.
Equations (24)—(26) also imply, as with the ﬁrst-best solution, b Uh = b U , b dh > b d ,a n d
b Lh > b L . That is, in the positive-inheritance group, the utility levels for high- and low-
ability types are equalized, but that a high-ability type consumes more in the second
period, and works more in the ﬁrst, as compared with a low-ability type.
























































Equations (27)—(32) show that taxation of individuals with no initial wealth subscribes
to the customary properties of second-best income taxation. Speciﬁcally, equations
(28)—(29) yield the “no distortion at the top” result (applying to both dh and Lh).
Moreover, with (wh,πh,βh) > (w ,π ,β ), the bracketed expressions in the right-hand
sides of (31) and (32) are both positive. Consequently, the left-hand sides of (31) and
(32) exceed one: β φ0 (d ) > 1 and w  >ϕ 0 (L ). In words, consumption of d  and supply
of L  are distorted downward. Finally, comparing βhφ0 (dh)=1with β φ0 (d ) > 1 and
wh = ϕ0 (Lh) with w  >ϕ 0 (L ) in conjunction with strict concavity of φ and strict
convexity of ϕ,t e l l su st h a tdh >d   and Lh >L  .
The interesting question from our perspective is to ﬁnd out in what way the second-
best allocation of an i-type diﬀers on the basis of his tag (belonging to the positive-
or zero-inheritance group). To address this issue, compare the ﬁrst-order conditions
(24)—(26) pertaining to the positive-inheritance group with (27)—(32) pertaining to the
zero-inheritance group. Consider ﬁrst, the h-type who faces no distortion regardless of
his inheritance status. Comparing (25)—(26) with (28)—(29) informs us that
b dh = dh, (33)
b Lh = Lh. (34)
15Observe that these equalities arise not only because of the no-distortion at the top
property but also the quasi-linearity of preferences. This latter property directs any
potential diﬀerences in allocations due to income eﬀects towards individuals’ ﬁrst-period
consumption levels. Comparison of (24) with (27) reveals the impact of income eﬀects.
We have
b Uh <U h. (35)
Rather counter-intuitively, the high-ability type who is the beneﬁciary of an accidental
bequest ends up with less utility than his counterpart who receives no inheritance.
Now, with second-period consumption and leisure being the same for an h-type with
and without an inheritance, it also follows that
b ch <c h. (36)
The lower level of utility enjoyed by the h-type who receives an inheritance, manifests
itself in a lower amount of ﬁrst-period consumption.
Next consider the  -types with and without an inheritance. The diﬀerence in their
allocations arise from both income and incentive eﬀects. Comparison of (25)—(26) with
(31)—(32) reveals that
b d  >d  , (37)
b L  >L  . (38)
An  -type who receives an inheritance consumes more in the second period and works
more in the ﬁrst as compared to an  -type who receives no inheritance. This is due to
his facing no distortions when he receives an inheritance but facing them when he has
no inheritance. Turning to utility levels, comparing (24) with (30) informs us that
b U  >U  . (39)
The  -type enjoys a higher level of utility if he receives an inheritance. However, these
inequalities do not allow us to compare b c  and c .
16To complete the discussion, we now ascertain the correctness of our initial assump-
tion that observability of bequests identiﬁes recipients’ types. One can do this despite
the fact that accidental bequests take three distinct values but we have only two types
of recipients. The identiﬁcation follows from our ﬁnding that b dh = dh > b d  >d  .G i v e n
these properties, leaving behind b dh = dh indicates that the deceased must have been of
type h while leaving either b d  or d  indicates type  . The assumption of a dynastically
immutable family type then establishes the recipient’s type.
4.2 Tax policy
Tax policy is set in order to implement the second-best allocations characterized by
(15)—(17) for the h-a n d -types in the positive-inheritance group and (18)—(23) for the
h-a n d -types in the zero-inheritance group. To achieve this, the policy speciﬁes an
implementing tax schedule, T(I,s,ω), as a function of the observable variables: income,
savings, and inheritance.17 In what follows, we state the properties of this function
with respect to income and savings brieﬂy, and then concentrate on the properties that
pertain to the taxation of bequests.
The properties of T(I,s,ω) with respect to income follow those of the Mirrlees
optimal income tax problem and thus are well-known. The properties of T(I,s,ω) with
respect to saving is derived in the Appendix. Suﬃce it to say here that implementation
requires saving subsidies as it did in the ﬁrst best. Now recall that in the ﬁrst best,
savings are subsidized at a rate equal to 1−πh for the h-type and 1−π  for the  -type
whether or not they receive an inheritance. In the second best, only the h-type faces
the same subsidy rate regardless of his inheritance status. Moreover, the subsidy rate is
t h es a m ea si nt h eﬁrst best. The treatment of the  -type, on the other hand, depends
on whether he receives an inheritance or not. If he does, he will face a marginal subsidy
rate of 1−π  as in the ﬁrst best. If he does not, he will face a smaller marginal subsidy
17One could also include c which can always be inferred from observability of the other variables.
However, this argument would be redundant.
17rate.18 This subsidy rate is, however, independent of the inheritance level, ω  or b ω .
T u r n i n gt ob e q u e s tt a x a t i o n ,c o n s i d e rﬁrst the treatment of high-ability individu-
als. They inherit either nothing or ωh = dh = b dh.T h e y p a y a t a x e q u a l t o Th =
T(Ih,s h,0) = Ih − ch − dh if they receive no inheritance and b Th = T(b Ih,b sh,ωh)=
b Ih+ωh−b ch− b dh = b Ih−b ch if they do. Now, from equations (33)—(36), b dh = dh, b Ih = Ih,
and b ch <c h. Hence b Th − Th = dh +( ch − b ch)=ωh +( ch − b ch),a n d
b Th − Th >ω h.
Consequently, the diﬀerence between an h-type’s total tax liabilities if he receives an
inheritance and if he does not, exceeds the inheritance he may receive. In this sense, the
high-ability individuals face a tax on accidental bequests that is higher than 100%. This
should not be surprising if one remembers that a high-ability person’s type is revealed
when he inherits ωh, but that his type remains unidentiﬁed otherwise. With his ability
known, an h-type who receives an inheritance enjoys no “informational rent” over an
 -type who too receives an inheritance. The symmetry of the social welfare function
then implies that the h-types in this group end up with the same utility level as the
 -types. On the other hand, since the ability of an h-type who inherits nothing remains
private information, he enjoys some informational rent.
Comparing how the  -types in positive- and zero-inheritance groups fare is rather
more complicated. In any given generation, some of the  -types have received no in-
heritance, some ω  = d ,a n ds o m eb ω  = b d .B u t a n  -type’s allocation depends only
on whether he has received an inheritance or not; those who have inherited ω  get an
identical allocation to those who have inherited b ω . Speciﬁcally, an  -type who inherits
nothing plans for a future consumption level of d ,w h i l ea n -type who has inherited
18Our formulation of second-best assumes public observability of savings at the individual level and
thus admits nonlinear taxation. An alternative formulation is to assume that only anonymous savings
are observable so that savings must be taxed linearly. This latter formulation can be done along Cremer
and Gahvari (1997). The nature of information on savings, and the ensuing properties of marginal
savings subsidies, does not change our results with respect to the taxation of bequests which is the focus
of our paper. We have thus ignored this issue.
18either ω  or b ω  plans for a consumption level of b d .19 This requires three tax levels:
T  = T(I ,s  ,0) = I  − c  − d  if the  -type inherits nothing, b T  = T(b I ,b s ,ω )=
b I  + ω  − b c  − b d  if he inherits ω ,a n db Te   = T(b I ,b s , b ω )=b I  + b ω  − b c  − b d  = b I  − b c ,
if he inherits b ω . Consequently, the inheritance tax paid by those who inherit ω  is
b T −T  = ω +
³
b I  − b c  − b d 
´
−(I  − c  − d ) and the inheritance tax paid by those who
inherit b ω  is b Te   − T  = b ω  +
³
b I  − b c  − b d 
´
− (I  − c  − d ).20
Subtract
³




b Te   − T 
´
to get
b Te   − b T  = b I  − b c  −
³
b I  + ω  − b c  − b d 
´
= b ω  − ω . (40)
This tells us that the  -types who inherit b ω  pay, eﬀectively, a tax on their extra in-
heritance, b ω  − ω , at a rate of 100%. One can then consider the tax paid on b ω  as
consisting of two parts: One part is paid on inheritances up to ω ; this tax is identical
to the inheritance tax paid by those who receive only ω . This is followed by a tax on
the remaining b ω −ω  inheritance; this is levied at a conﬁscatory rate. Beyond this, one
cannot, at this level of generality, determine whether the tax on ω  is smaller or larger
than 100%. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁnding b U  >U   does not allow one to conclude that an
 -type with an inheritance has a larger net disposable income than an  -type with no
inheritance. Put diﬀerently, one cannot conclude that b T  − ω  is smaller than T . The
reason is that the  -types with no inheritance face a distortion on their consumption
19Thus an  -type who has inherited ω  and an  -type who has inherited e ω  would leave e ω  in bequests
if they die early.
20The deﬁnition of the bequest tax is somewhat ambiguous here. One can think of the bequest
tax to be T (I,s,ω) − T(I,s,0), i.e., the extra tax paid by an individual with bequest ω,f o rag i v e n
value for every other argument of the tax function. But for a nonlinear tax function, this diﬀer-
ence is not necessarily constant and generally varies with the values I and s take. There is also an
added problem in our two-type setting. Here, one has to calculate T (Ii,s i,ω i) − T (Ii,s i,0) as well as
T
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which may not only yield diﬀerent answers but more problematically are





in the second are hypothetical. As usual, in two-type models, there are many
degrees of freedom in constructing the implementing tax function and this aﬀects T (I,s,ω)−T(I,s,0).
We circumvent all these diﬃculties by deﬁning the bequest tax to be the diﬀerence between net tax
payments for an i-type if he receives an inheritance and if he does not: T

e Ii,e si,ω i

− T (Ii,s i,0).
19Table 1. Second-best allocations and bequest taxes
ε =0 .50 ε =1 3
positive inheritance zero inheritance positive inheritance zero inheritance
b ch,c h 31.918 33.767 31.701 32.801
b dh,d h 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
b Ih,I h 40.000 40.000 40.000 40.000
b c ,c   17.026 15.052 16.809 13.618
b d ,d   0.750 0.733 0.750 0.577
b I ,I   10.000 9.504 10.000 6.594
b Th,T h 8.082 5.233 8.299 6.199
b T ,T   -7.043 -6.281 -6.982 -7.601
b Te   -7.026 -6.809
bundle and their lower utility level may very well be due to this distortion. The example
below illustrates this point and establishes that bequest taxes can be larger as well as
smaller than 100%. More interestingly perhaps, our theoretical results do not guarantee
that b T  − T  is positive. Put diﬀerently, the  -types may even face a bequest subsidy.
The example below illustrates this possibility as well.
4.3 An example
Consider a quadratic disutility for labor ϕ(L)=0 .05L2 and a logarithmic utility for
future consumption φ(d)=l nd so that our quasi-linear preferences (1) takes the form
Ui = ci + πiβi lndi − 0.05L2
i. Assume further that the concave transformation for U
is iso-elastic, as previously deﬁned, and given by v(U)=U1−ε/(1 − ε) with ε>0.
The various parameter of the model are set at: wh =2 ,w   =1 ,n h = n  =1 ,πh =
π  =0 .5,βh =1 ,β  =0 .75. Table 1 reports the numerical solutions for the second-best
allocations when ε =0 .5 and ε =1 3 . It also reports the values of total tax liabilities in
each case.
The interesting property from our perspective is the behavior of b T  − T  and its
comparison to ω .W i t h ε =0 .5,w eh a v eb T  = −7.043 and T  = −6.281 so that
20b T  −T  = −0.762. That is, bequests of the size ω  =0 .733 are subsidized. Interestingly,
even the  -types who receive b ω  are subsidized in this case. They pay a bequest tax of
b ω  − ω  =0 .750− 0.733 = 0.017 on their extra inheritance so that they receive a net
subsidy of 0.762 − 0.017 = 0.745. On the other hand, at ε =1 3 , one has b T  = −6.982
and T  = −7.601 so that b T  − T  =0 .619. T h i si sg r e a t e rt h a nω  = d  =0 .577 and
we have a tax that exceeds 100%. Comparing the numbers for ε =0 .5 and ε =1 3
illustrates that the second-best tax on accidental bequests may fall short of as well as
exceed a conﬁscatory rate.21 A second interesting feature of these numbers is that a
higher desired degree of redistribution calls for a higher tax on bequests. Whereas a
“small” degree of inequality aversion–a small ε–calls for a bequest subsidy, a “large”
degree of inequality aversion–a large ε–results in a bequest tax that exceeds 100%.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the society described in Proposition 1 but assume that indi-
vidual types are not publicly observable while income, consumption levels, and bequests
are.
(i) The second best solution has the following properties: (a) Individuals can be
partitioned into two groups (tags): Those who receive an accidental bequest and those
who do not. The characteristics of people in the ﬁrst group can be inferred from their
bequests and they will be given a ﬁrst-best tax schedule. The characteristics of people
in the second group remain private information and they will face a standard Mirrlees
optimal tax problem. (b) The high-ability individuals who receive an inheritance lose all
their informational rent and b Uh = b U . (c) Individuals in the zero-inheritance group face
no distortion at the top and a downward distortion on labor supply and savings for the
 -types. The h-types in this group enjoy some informational rent so that Uh >U  .
(ii) Second-best allocation of the h-types in the positive- and zero-inheritance groups
diﬀer according to b ch <c h, b dh = dh, Lh = Lh, and we have b Uh <U h.
21Remember that a subsidy also means a less than 100% tax.
21(iii) In every generation, some of the  -types have inherited b ω  = b d ,s o m eω  = d ,
and some nothing. Second-best allocation for the  -types is such that all individuals who
have received an inheritance will, regardless of their inheritance level, receive the same
consumption bundle and enjoy the same level of utility b U . Allocations of the positive-
and the zero-inheritance groups diﬀer according to b d  >d  , b L  >L  , and we have
b U  >U  .
(iv) Decentralization of second-best allocations requires: (a) Marginal saving subsi-
dies; (b) High-ability individuals face a bequest tax of more then 100% (b Th − Th >ω h);
(c) Low-ability individuals face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than
100% and may even be negative (b T  − T  <ω  , b T  − T  >ω  ,o rb T  − T  < 0).
5O p t i n g o u t
A striking feature of our results is that the bequest tax may exceed 100%. One may
consider this possibility as “unrealistic” in that legal systems often allow individuals to
refuse an inheritance. From a strictly informational perspective, this should make no
diﬀerence for our setup. The individual who refuses a bequest can still be tagged (the
information on his ability status has been revealed). On practical grounds, however,
this poses a challenge to our results. Another objection is that children may prevail
upon their parents to write a will that leaves their estate, in case of death, to charitable
organizations (and not to their children). To address these objections, and to have im-
plementing tax functions that are compatible with existing legal structures, this section
reconsiders the question of accidental bequests under the assumption that one can not
be made worse oﬀ as a result of receiving an inheritance.
To study this problem, all one has to do is to add two new incentive constraints,
b Uh ≥ Uh and b U  ≥ U , to our previous second-best problem. Recalling that the solution
to that problem satisﬁed the latter of these two constraints, we proceed as follows.
We impose only the b Uh ≥ Uh constraint on the problem and verify ex post that the
22solution does not violate the other constraint, b U  ≥ U . The Lagrangian expression of
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The ﬁrst-order conditions are given in Appendix B. On the basis of these equations,
one can derive three conclusions regarding the nature of the solution in this case and
how it compares to the second-best solution we had previously.
First, the presence of the extra constraint b Uh = Uh implies that we no longer oﬀer
the individuals with an inheritance a non-distorted solution. In particular, the solution
is no longer characterized by equal utilities for h-a n d -types (i.e., we no longer have
b Uh = b U ). To see this, substitute for μ from (47) into (44) to get










+ γ =0 .








< 0 so that b Uh > b U . This is quite interesting.
It tells us that constraining b Uh not to be smaller than Uh accords the h-types of the
positive-inheritance group to enjoy a rent that they did not have previously (compared
to the  -types in the same group).
Second, consider how the h-types fare in the two tagged groups. Use (44) and (48)







Rearranging this relationship yields
λ − γ = πhλ.
23Now replace γ in (45) by (1 − πh)λ, (λ − γ) in (49) by πhλ, and compare the resulting
expressions, using b Uh = Uh, to show that b dh = dh. A similar argument establishes
that b Ih = Ih. This tells us that the h-types are treated identically whether they receive
an inheritance or not; pooling them together is optimal. The implication of this result
is that h-types should now face a conﬁscatory tax on their inheritance. This is not
surprising. Without the added b Uh ≥ Uh constraint, b Uh will be smaller than Uh and
h-types face a more than 100% bequest tax. With the added constraint, and given that
pooling is optimal, one cannot go beyond 100%.
T h i r d ,t u r n i n gt ot h e -type individuals, we observe that the ﬁrst-order conditions
remain exactly the same as previously (in Section 4). Consequently, all our results
pertaining to this group remain valid. This also serves as the ex-post veriﬁcation that
the b U  ≥ U  constraint we had ignored is not violated. As far as the tax treatment of
bequests are concerned, we have, as previously, that the tax for  -types can be anything
from a subsidy to a tax that exceeds the 100% mark.
These results are summarized as:
Proposition 3 Consider the society described in Proposition 2 but assume that nobody
can be made worse oﬀ as a result of receiving an inheritance.
(i) The high-ability types in the positive-inheritance group enjoy a rent as compared
to the low-ability types in the group. That is, b Uh > b U  replaces b Uh = b U  result of
Proposition 2.
(ii) All high-ability types receive the same allocation regardless of their inheritance
status. Thus b Uh = Uh replaces b Uh <U h, and bequest tax of 100% replaces a bequest tax
of more than 100%, results of Proposition 2.
(iii) All the results of Proposition 2 pertaining to the low-ability types remain valid.
In particular, low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger
than 100% and may even be negative.
246 Summary and conclusion
This paper has questioned the validity of the conventional wisdom that purely acciden-
tal bequests should be taxed at a conﬁscatory rate. It has employed a model wherein
individuals of diﬀerent abilities may live for one or for two periods with diﬀerent prob-
abilities of survival. It has shown that the proposition is correct in a ﬁrst-best environ-
ment when individuals’ productivity and longevity are publicly observable. Under this
circumstance, subsidizing each ability-type’s saving at a rate equal to his probability of
an early death, in conjunction with lump-sum taxes that vary according to individuals’
ability types and inheritance status, mimics a perfect annuity market. All accidental
bequests are taxed at 100% and all individuals enjoy the same level of utility.
In the second-best, individual abilities and survival probabilities are publicly un-
observable. Assuming that types and survival probabilities are positively correlated,
individuals can be partitioned into two groups (tags). The ﬁrst group consists of people
who receive an accidental bequest and the second of those who receive nothing. The
characteristics of people in the ﬁrst group can be inferred from their bequests and they
will be given a ﬁrst-best tax schedule. The characteristics of people in the second group
remains private information and they will have to face a standard Mirrlees optimal tax
problem.
With their ability type being inferred, the high-ability individuals in the group of
people who receive an inheritance enjoy no informational rent and will end up with the
same utility level as the low-ability types in this group. On the other hand, high-ability
types in the group of people who receive no inheritance enjoy an informational rent. This
implies that high-ability types will be better oﬀ if they do not receive an inheritance.
Similar comparison for low-ability types reveals that they will be better oﬀ receiving
an inheritance. In this sense, accidental bequests are a curse for the rich and a boon
for the poor. Finally, to decentralize these allocations, one must levy marginal saving
subsidies that vary with income and inheritance status but not with the inheritance
25level. High-ability individuals face a bequest tax of more then 100%, while low-ability
individuals face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may
even be negative.
Finally, we studied the implications for our results if people are able to refuse the
inheritances that are due to them. We showed that in this case, high-ability types in
the positive-inheritance group enjoy a rent as compared to the low-ability types in the
group. We also showed that all high-ability types are pooled together and receive the
same allocation regardless of their inheritance status. Consequently, they will face a
bequest tax of 100% rather than one which exceeds 100%. As far as the low-ability
types are concerned, however, all of our previous results remain intact. Speciﬁcally,
low-ability types continue to face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger
than 100% and may even be negative.
We conclude by revisiting two of the paper’s main assumptions. First, we have
considered a highly stylized setting wherein the observability of bequests brings about a
drastic change in the structure of information available to the tax authority. This drastic
change comes about from the assumption that types are dynastically immutable: if a
person is of a given type, his oﬀsprings will also be of the same type. In following this
approach, we have been led by a desire to convey our point in a crisp fashion with no
ambiguity. A more realistic setting posits only that there is a high probability–and
not a certainty–for children to be of the same type as their parents. Our main point,
that incorporating the informational content of bequests improves the design of tax
structures, including bequest taxes, should remain valid in this more realistic setting.
The speciﬁcs of the optimal tax policy would of course become more complicated.
Second, we have assumed that individual’s preferences are quasi-linear. Accordingly,
in the laissez-faire, an individual’s second-period consumption, and thus his saving
which constitutes the accidental bequest, does not depend on the bequest received
(there is no income eﬀect). This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis but it is not crucial
26for the main results of our paper. To be more precise, its relevance is conﬁned to the
laissez-faire allocation; limiting the equilibrium levels of positive accidental bequests at
the steady state (to two). It plays no such role for ﬁrst- and second best allocations.
With more general preferences too, the tagging is between those who inherit nothing
and those who inherit something (not how much). It thus remains optimal to treat all
individuals of a given type identically regardless of the size of their inheritance. We will
then have four bequest levels, rather than three under quasilinear preferences. As long
as one can order the four bequest levels all our results will go through.
27Appendix
A Characterization of marginal saving subsidies
Faced with the tax function T(I,s,ω), the i-type in the positive-inheritance group
chooses I and s to maximize






and the i-type in the zero-inheritance group chooses I and s to maximize






Denote the partial derivative of T(·) with respect to s by Ts(·). The ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to s, whether one is in the positive or zero-inheritance group, is then equal
to
−Ts(I,s,ω) − 1+πiβiφ0 (s)=0 .
Substituting the second-best value of πiβiφ0 (s) from (25) for everyone who receives an
inheritance, and from (28) and (31) for h-a n d -types who do not receive an inheritance,





=1− πiβiφ0 (b si)=1− πi,i = h, , (41)
− Ts (Ih,s h,0) = 1 − πhβhφ0 (sh)=1− πh, (42)











28B First-order conditions associated with LV
Diﬀerentiating LV yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions
∂LV
∂b ch








+ γ =0 , (44)
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